[轉載] FRUS (China, 1969)
1. Memorandum From Richard L. Sneider of the National
Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
Washington, January 25, 1969.
Republic of China (GRC) Armed Forces Reorganization and Reduction
Recommendation for Clearance of Telegram
For some time, there has been concern that the GRC armed forces
are larger than necessary for the defense of Taiwan and are imposing
an increasing burden on its economic development given declining U.S.
military assistance and the cessation three years ago of grant economic
assistance. Additionally, the GRC has been pressing for U.S. provision
of sophisticated military equipment, particularly F–4s.2 Last August,
our message finally got across and the GRC suggested that we begin
consultations on force reduction and reorganization plans providing
for modernization of key elements of the GRC forces.3 The GRC suggested
that we propose a three-year reorganization plan.
Attached for your clearance is the proposed State/Defense response.
4 It is the result of months of careful study and consideration,
including coordination with CINCPAC. It proposes that instead of providing
the GRC with a finished plan, a joint U.S.–GRC Consultative
Committee be set up to assist the GRC in developing its own plan taking
fully into account limitations of projected U.S.–GRC resources. This
approach would force the GRC to undertake systematic analysis of resource
Except for a conditional commitment on helicopters (a major item
on the GRC acquisition list) the message makes no firm commitment
with respect to future U.S. assistance. There is, however, clear implication
that grant military assistance on a decreasing scale and some military
credit sales would be continued assuming agreement on the force
reduction/modernization program. Guidelines are provided for the U.S.
representatives on the joint Consultative Committee, calling for
—(1) a break [brake?]on rising GRC defense spending;
—(2) a GRC force capable of defending Taiwan and the Penghus
taking into account GRC unilateral commitments with respect to the
Offshore Islands; and,
—(3) within this framework a reduction and modernization of the
The most sensitive aspect of the proposal is that it defines the role
of the GRC forces as defense of Taiwan and the Penghus and by inference
unilaterally the Offshore Islands. Without specifically saying so
this eliminates offensive capabilities (return to the Mainland) from GRC
military planning. The U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan and the
Penghus is reiterated so that this is taken into account in the force reorganization
discussions. However, Embassy Taipei is specifically instructed
not to volunteer any statements on the U.S. response in the
event the Offshore Islands are attacked, but if the GRC raises this question,
to refer them to the 1955 Joint Congressional Resolution.5 This
Resolution authorizes the President to employ U.S. forces in the event
of an armed attack against the Offshore Islands if he judges that it
would be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Taiwan
and the Penghus.
I would recommend approval of the proposed telegram. It represents
a very thorough consideration of a most knotty and sensitive issue.
It is consistent with our commitments to the GRC and with our
efforts to reduce military assistance to it and to persuade the GRC to
undertake a more rational consideration of resource allocation between
defense spending and economic development. The principal alternatives
are (a) to continue in the present mold dealing with haphazard
and other ill-considered requests for modern equipment and a continued
spiraling up of GRC defense expenditures; or (b) to cut off grant
military assistance or threaten to do so with the object of forcing
economies on the GRC but with the attendant risk that this could provoke
a crisis of confidence regarding all U.S. commitments to the GRC.
We could also give the GRC our own reorganization plan but it would
be much preferable to guide them to think through their own problems.