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2007/01/17

[個人寫作] The Decision Making Process of U.S. Attitude Towards

The Decision Making Process of U.S. Attitude Towards to the Nationalists'“Return to Mainland” in early 1960s

I‧ Introduction

By the beginning of 1962, the Nationalists were tempted to try to exploit the serious economic difficulties on the mainland. GRC Chiang’s New Year’s message, for example, asserted that Taiwan was preparing a major offensive and stood ready to assist mainland uprisings against the Communists should such occur. The declaration implied that the United States could be expected to support such Nationalist military operations on the mainland.

The main purpose of the essay is to place the context and historical meanings of the Nationalist “Return to Mainland” through the background, the process of arrangement, especially using Graham Allison’s decision –making models to explore its influence to President Kennedy and American foreign policy.

Although the U.S. supported the Nationalists to impede Communist China’s expansion, President Kennedy accepted Dean Rusk and W. Averell Harriman’s suggestion and decided to ignore Ray Cline and Drumright’s ideas by supporting Chiang’s “Return to China” policy.

II‧ Model I Rational Actor

(1) Goals and objectives The interests and values of the agent are translated into “pay off” or “preference” function, which represents desirability or utility of alternative sets of consequences.

(2) Alternatives The rational agent must choose among a set of alternatives displayed before her or him in a particular situation.

(3) Consequences To each alternative is attached a set of consequences or outcomes of choice that will ensue if that particular alternative is chosen.

(4) Choice Rational choice consists simply of selecting that alternative whose consequences rank highest in the decision maker’s payoff function.

In “The Rational Actor Model”, the unitary states or governments are the key actors in international affairs and the states act rationally, calculating costs and benefits of alternative courses of action and choosing the action that minimizes their utility. As Anthony Downs has noted, “Economic theorists have nearly always looked at decisions as though they were made by rational mind….” “If a theorist knows the end of some decision maker, he can predict what actions will be taken to achieve them as follows (1) he calculates the most reasonable way for the decision maker to reach his goals, and (2) he assumes this way will actually be chosen because the decision maker is rational.”

For Chiang Kai-shek, the mainland’s economic troubles spelled opportunity, perhaps the last chance to fulfill is dream of a triumphal return to the mainland. In 1962, Chiang pressed for U.S. backing for Nationalist airdrops of 2000-3000 men to simulate resistance on the mainland.

Convinced that Chiang’s operations on that scale would be disastrous, U.S. officials reminded Chiang of his commitment under notes exchange with the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 not to attack the mainland without U.S. agreement. The U.S. government hesitated to rebuff Chiang completely, however, fearing he might prepare secretly for an invasion and perhaps even launch a suicidal attack in the expectation of forcing Kennedy’s help.

The Kennedy Administration was not opposed to assisting Chiang’s harassment of the Communist regime. CIA proprietaries such as Air America and Civil Air Transport supported Nationalist raids on the mainland.

There are two broad options. One would be a major landing in South China designed to put several divisions ashore with adequate air cover and seize a bridgehead. Into it we would pour more divisions and air support. One bonus effect might be the impact on Communist operations in SEA. But many objections loom. First Chiang simply lacks the resources (except for an unopposed landing in an area already in revolt). Thus he would need substantial U.S. air cover, air and sea lift, and logistic support. Kennedy can’t see this in the cards for U.S. without some tremendous provocations by the ChiComs, such as their overt intervention in SEA.

In any case, if U.S made a major attempt to retake South China, the Chinese would almost certainly appeal for Soviet aid and the USSR would grant it in good measure. The Soviets would recognize that so long as they confined themselves to defending the ChiCom regime, most of world opinion would be with them; they would not in a period of nuclear stand-off be running unacceptable risk of U.S. retaliation against the USSR itself. So why should they accept the major reserve involved in a successful western counter-attack in China, particularly since they would see an opportunity to re-establish their influence over Pieping. For all these reasons why President Kennedy cannot see the United States get involved in even a local war with the USSR over China.

This left the option of local probing operations, initially small but if these prove out them on a gradually increasing scale, designed to see whether the GRC couldn’t gin up a local revolution. Although Chiang might ask U.S. to back the first option above, Kennedy himself suspect Chiang would settle for U.S support or even tacit acquiescence in such probes. The GRC apparently has enough well-trained forces for small scale operations, although they are deficient in lift. There is some appeal in a probing operation designed to find out whether the ChiCom position is as brittle as some think. Moreover, the Soviets might not regard such probes as justifying their counter-intervention, but would prefer to let Peiping stew in its own justice, counting on a Peiping appeal to Moscow if the situation got out of hand.

If the United States look further at this proposition. Assuming that it were successful and that a revolt of some size could be ginned up, we would then be faced with the circumstances described under first option above. The GRC would argue for a mjor campaign, with substantial U.S. support. So U.S. vwery success would lead to a situation in which Peiping, humbling itself, would have to turn to the Soviets for aid. Then the United States would have a major U.S./USSR war in China which, even if it did not spread, U.S. would be unlikely to win. Also, what if the GRC failed, even after an initial success? Assuming that the failure were visible enough, it might mean the end of the GRC’s pretensions as “the only legitimate government” of China. In fact, the backlash of an unsuccessful attempt would only undermine further the GRC’s international position and make it even more difficult for U.S to preserve it as an independent government on Taiwan. Chiang might be willing to take this gamble, but should the United States?

There is, of course, a third possible outcome between failure and complete success. In effect the GRC could stir up enough unrest in South China to deplete further ChiCom resources and energies and to make even more difficult Peiping’s economic recovery. However, even this could lead the ChiComs to make their peace with Moscow.

Although President Kennedy did not want the Nationalist return to the mainland, he finally decided to temporize to transport small-scale airdrops and try to persuade Chiang to postpone it. The Kennedy Administration, however, was not prepared to allow Chiang to draw the United States into a war with China.
President Kennedy, clarifying the United States attitude in face of the huge-Chinese Communist military buildup in Fukien on the mainland, declared that the policy of his administration concerning the Chinese offshore islands if Quemoy and Matsu is the same as under President Eisenhower. The chief Executive made this announcement in person at the beginning of his press emphasizing that the Taiwan Straits situation arising from “very large movements” Chinese Communist troops into this area is “a matter of serious concern” to military buildup might be aggressive action against the offshore islands of Quemoy and MAtsu. In that recent, Kennedy said, the United States will follow President Eisenhower’s policy of 1958 in defending the offshore islands if any aggressive action against them might threaten the safety of Formosa and the Pescadores. “Any threat to the offshore islands,” President Kennedy explained, “must be judged in relation to its wider meaning for the safety of Formosa and the peace of the area.” The President also said that the United States treaty with the Republic of China is “defensive in character.”

On September 11, 1963, an extended discussion between President Kennedy and Chiang prompted the President to question the proposal to send commands against Chinese nuclear installations. Kennedy doubted the proposals feasibility. To avoid another Bay of Pigs operation “based more on hope than on realistic appraisals,” Washington and Taipei needed better intelligence about conditions on the mainland.

After considering all these factors, prospects for success in a major spoiling operation directed at Red China are highly problematical, particularly since the Soviets hav the counter-option of checkmating U.S. at any time they choose. The Soviet Union might let Peiping stew awhile to teach it a lesson, but if things got bad enough they wouldn’t hesitate to step in. If they did so, U.S would have succeed in pushing Peiping and Moscow together again, in effect postponing the day when the two giants of the Communist world may be at each other’s throats instead of the United States’. Moreover, bad as things are on the mainland, there is no evidence of any feeling that the GRC could make them better, even if U.S. could get across that if would bring with it huge quantities of U.S. food and other aid.

Drumright sent a report to Governor Harriman saying that further approaches made and William Bundy on occasion of latter’s recent visit to Taiwan. However, Chiang’s latest approach also suggests quickening of his resolve to “do something about mainland” in months ahead. There was latest agreements that USG must soon take cognizance in one form or another of Chiang’s latest suggested plans. It was agreed that best choice of action as of now would be to continue discussions. In doing so he would attempt without commitment to obtain specific details of Chiang’s latest plans for consideration by U.S. authorities. Once specific plans were obtained, U.S. military authorities here would study them for feasibility and pass their views to higher U.S. authorities for consideration. Consensus was that on discussing problem with Chiang and his son a sympathetic attitude on U.S. part would be desirable as to keep GRC side engaged and thus permit U.S side to study proposals. There was general agreement that cold shouldering or ignoring of Chiang’s proposals was latest desirable course of action and could lead to undesirable actions and consequences. It was also consensus that in discussing problem further GRC side should be pressed to present concrete intelligence to support uprising among people. In this respect it was concluded that Chiang is predicating his plans of touching off uprising on assumptions rather than realistic intelligence appraisals.

In light of foregoing discussion it was agreed continue discussions with Chiang and his son designed to elicit further concrete details. In doing so make it clear continuing talks implied no new commitments. Also directly keep to fore requirement on part of GRC to observe restraints set forth in Mutual Defense Treaty and related agreements. Although Chiang was quite obviously reluctant to discuss this problem Drumright. Drumright expect to touch on it when he see Chiang before departing Taiwan. Drumright accepted Chiang’s plan in its present form, but he would hope that it would be possible for Washington to respond in such way as not to constitute a flat negative. Otherwise, the United States risk possibility of Chiang’s jumping off on his own on some risky adventure.

III‧ Model II Organizational Model

Government behavior relevant to any important problem reflects the independent output of several organizations, partially coordinated by government leaders. Government leaders can substantially disturb, but not substantially control,
he behavior of these organizations. The process of decision-making is controlled by the concerned governmental organizations. Experts and scholars are invited to
provide the concerned organizations with their advice and suggestions.

The actor is not a monolithic nation or government but rather a constellation of loosely allied organizations on top of which government leaders sit.

(1) Factored Problems and Fractionated Power Surveillance of the multiple facets of foreign affairs requires that problems be cut up and parceled out to various organizations.

(2) Organizational Missions Whether missions are stated more formally or more vaguely, many organizations, especially business, have an explicit, brief mission statement that seeks to define for their members and customers what business they are in and what seek to accomplish. Many government organizations have formal charters that specify their authorities, are arenas in which they are directed to operate, and activities that are forbidden.

(3) Operational Objectives, Special Capabilities, and Culture Primary responsibility for a narrow set of problems with the gritty, everyday requirements for action to produce distinctive sets of beliefs about how a mission should be implemented and what capabilities are needed or wanted to perform it.

(4) Actions as Organizational output The preeminent feature of organizational activity is its programmed character: the extent to which behavior in any particular case is an enactment pre-established routines.

In Organizational Behavior, the CIA’s role of raising the problem, providing the information and color (estimate) the face of the issue, all testify the features of the organizational behavior that actual occurrences are organizational out puts. Besides, the limitation of CIA’s intelligence work that hesitated Kennedy’s decision also proved that existing organizational capacities for employing present physical assets constitute the range of effective choice open to government leaders confronted with any problem and organizational outputs structure the situation within the narrow constraints of which leader must make their decisions about an issue. Moreover, the report of Planning Council that obviously influence President Kennedy’s attitude toward PRC reflected the professional feature of organizational behavior.
Secretary Rusk quickly informed Chiang that any major Nationalist adventure on the mainland required American concurrence, and such approval had certainly not been given to a Nationalist invasion. Taipei was also informed hat bellicose statements against the mainland did not help the Nationalist government’s international reputation. Despite United States warnings, Chiang persisted in suggesting that an internationally supported invasion of the mainland was forthcoming.

At the same time, W. Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State emphasized that the United States “had no intensions under existing for an attack on the mainland.
Recommendation for U.S. Shift toward Accommodation
In the fall of 1961, the Policy Planning of the State Department recommended that the United States pursue a general policy toward mainland China of holding the door open “to a more satisfactory relationship with the U.S.,” while trying to subdue mutual hostilities.

The Office of Far Eastern Affairs, headed by W. Averell Harriman, also supported eventual adoption of a new orientation toward the Peking regime: however, it emphasized that the building of effective barriers against Communist expansion in Asia needed to take priority over attempt to hold the door open possibilities pf muting hostilities and easing strained relations. Harriman endorsed the objective of keeping the Peking regime out of the UN and maintaining the policy of nonrecognition of Communist China. However, he agreed with measures to investigate future planning with regard to US-PRC relations and to determine the conditions that would need to be met in order to change the status quo.

More policy advisers, however, advocated that the inability to pursue diplomatic relations with Communist China should be addressed with “expansions of regret and of respect for the Chinese people and their historic contributions to world culture.” James C. Thomson, special assistant to Bowles, asserted that the Kennedy administration should endeavor to assume a more conciliatory attitude toward the People’s Republic of China and demonstrate at least a willingness to explore the possibility of relations with Communist China. He was convinced that U.S. actions regarding the PRC ought to be conducted within a wider context of long-term objectives rather than within a narrow one focused on immediate implications. Agreeing that the United States could no abandon Taiwan, Thomson advocated a posture demonstrating “that we hold open the door to improve relations and stand ready to negotiate issues.”

Others in the Kennedy administration were less optimistic, highlighting the dangers of increasing contact with Communist China and recommending further observations before any significant changes in U.S. policy were considered. At the end of March 1961, J. Graham Parsons left his position as assistant secretary to Under Secretary of State Bowels containing thoughts on Communist China, typifying the hardline view with which proponents of flexibility perennially had to contend. In it, Parsons referred to the China problem as “an intractable one, to which there is no ready solution.”

There are five fundamental gaps between what the President actually approved and what he thought he was approving arose from at least three sources:

First, in part they arose because of the newness of the President and his administration. He didn’t fully know the strengths and weaknesses of his various advisers. He didn’t yet feel he could trust his own instincts against the judgments of recognized experts.

Second, in part these gaps arose because supposed pressures of time and secrecy permitted too little consideration of the plan and its merits by anyone other than its authors and advocates. Only the CIA and the Joint Chiefs had an opportunity to study and ponder the details of the plan.
Finally, these gaps arose in part because the new administration had not yet fully organized itself for crisis planning, enabling the pre-committed authors and advocates of the project in the CIA and Joint Chiefs to exercise a dominant influence.

Nationalist Chinese Military Action
In September 1963, DCI McCone had invited Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang Kai-shek’s son, for discussions. Although there are long-standing differences between Washington and Taipei over military operations against PRC, the dialogue easily shifted to the possibility of action against the PRC nuclear program. Later, Chiang met National Security Assistant Bundy. Chiang Ching-kuo raised the issue of attacking China’s nuclear facilities on several occasions. Although Bundy favored measures to “weaken” the PRC, he doubted that plans to seize territory world work and counseled against action that could realign Beijing with Moscow or “trigger a major conflict”. Chiang brought up possible action against Beijing’s nuclear installations. Bundy responded that the “United States is very interested in whether something could be planned” that could have a “delaying and preventive effect on the nuclear growth of China.” He believed, however, that those measures needed “most careful study.”

State did attempt a major operation of this sort asking Drumright that U.S hoped Chiang’s New Year’s Day speech call for “return to the mainland” in 1962 meant no exchange in policy, and reminding him of thee required prior consultation with the United States.

Drumright replied that this would only outrage Chiang and revive his latent apprehensions about new administration’s China policy. So State told Drumright merely to talk with the foreign Minister. This won’t quite do if U.S. are going to have the necessary impact on the Gimo. The United States needs to be more forthright and honest and to have some trade goods at hand, perhaps more development aid. U.S may also need a special envoy to carry this word, since Drumright can’t do it effectively.

In essence, Cline expressed the view that the situation left the United States with but two courses of action, as follows:

1. To give Chiang a flat “no” in his request for United States support of several clandestine operations against the China mainland involving airdrops of 200 to 300 man teams. According to Cline, this alternative would unquestionably evoke a bitter reaction from Chiang which might lead to anti-American demonstrations, disruption of American and other programs on Taiwan, and, conceivably, “desperation” attacks by the GRC against the mainland in hopes of involving the United States. Cline also reported that in such circumstances the Generalissimo might ultimately resign as President of the GRC, thus causing political chaos on Taiwan and in U.S.-GRC relations.

2. To temporize by agreeing to furnish suitable aircraft and other support for one GRC operation of approximately 50-100 men against the mainland. Cline anticipated that it might require from six to twelve months before the operation could actually take place, thanks to the delay needed to add proper electronic counter-measure equipment to the aircraft (either C-130’s or C-123’s) and to complete adequate planning and training for the operation. During this time we would, of course, be in constant touch with the GRC in the feasibility of the project. WE would also be able and, if deemed necessary, to make plans fro dealing with successors to Chiang Kai-shek if U.S. subsequently were to decide that we should discontinue our support of his plans and the consequences noted in 1, above, should develop. On the other hand, if U.S. would wish to avoid a showdown with Chiang at the end of the period of grace, U.S. should possibly find ways to bring about further delays in GRC moves against the mainland.

IV‧ Model III Bureaucratic Model

(1) Separated Institutions Sharing Power Each participant sits in a seat that separate responsibilities. Each is committed to fulfilling his responsibilities as he sees them. Thus, those who share with the President the job of governance cannot be entirely responsive to his command.

(2) The Power to Persuade In status and formal powers, the President is chief. Every other participant’s business somehow involves him. But his authority guarantees only an extensive clerkship. If the President is to rule, he must squeeze from the formal powers a full array if bargaining advantages. The President can use the advantage to translate the needs and fears if other participants into an appreciation that what he wants of them is what they should, in their own best interests, do.

(3) Bargaining According to the Processes The game of presidential persuasion is not played at random. Rather, certain processes structured the play. Processes are regularized channels for bringing issues to the point of choice. Presidential attention becomes fixed, and bargaining earnest, only as issues are rendered actionable by moving along lines of process toward deadlines.

(4) Intranational and International Relations The intranational games can indeed include foreign participants, leading some analysts to call such simultaneous intranational/international interactions “two-level games.”
The Governmental Politics Model sees no unitary actor but rather many actors as players—players who focus not on a single strategic issue but on many diverse intra-national problems as well. Politics is the mechanism of choice. Each player pulls and hauls with the power at his discretion for outcomes that will advance his conception of national, organizational, group, and personal interests. Political leaders at the top of the apparatus are joined by the men who occupy positions on top of major organizations to form a circle of central players. Where you stand depends on where you sit. Horizontally, the diverse demands upon each player shape his priorities, perceptions, and issues.

In Governmental Politics Model, the NSC’s stance on the use of forces against PRC contradicted Department of State’s non-alarmist thinking. However, the result of the pulling and hauling was quite different between President Kennedy and Vice-President Johnson’s. Because of Kennedy’s serious thinking of the PRC’s nuclear threat, the administration had actively tried to destruct PRC’s nuclear facilities. However, Johnson’s cautious attitude made the voices of military actions fade out. It proved that President’s preference played an important role in decision-making process. Besides, the President’s preference also created a “Action-channel”, and it structure the game by pre-selecting the major players, determining their usual points of entrance into the game, and distributing particular advantages for each game.

President Kennedy strove to persuade all concerned parties that intended to maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Straits. Harriman endorsed Kennedy’s position in January 1961, and generally accepted the notion of a more flexible U.S. posture toward Communist China, he advised that potential changes be appraised through cautious, through examination of all potential implications. W. Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, soon made a special stop in Taipei in March and urged restraint upon the Nationalists. Harriman once again reminded Chiang that he did not have United States consent for major military operations against the People’s Republic. The Kennedy Administration was worried enough about the effects of Chiang’s posturing to use the Warsaw channel to assure the Chinese Communists that Washington was not urging to invade the mainland.

There is going to be a problem in 1962. Peiping’s still acute economic crisis, the depending Sino Soviet schism, the aging Chiang’s own feel that the GRC’s own position is eroding, and finally Chiang’s continuing apprehensions over U.S. policy are all leading him to consider more and more a final gamble. There are renewed indications of GRC preparations for at least probing operations. Now Gimo himself has asked Cline whether time ripe for discussing whole issue with JFK.

Before fobbing Chiang off, let’s at least consider his case. Certainly Peiping feebler than any time since it consolidated the 1947-49 revolution. It is obviously on its own, with the Soviet using a slow-down if not cessation of economic and military aid as means to bring Mao back into line. Food shortage continues into third year, and we recently had good indications that even the army’s capabilities have been affected. Moreover, the GRC is probably a wasting asset—so we too must consider whether or not to use it before it declines past the point of no return.

Ed Rice’s excellent study on “return to the mainland” concluded that it could only be successful if there were a major revolution in Red China (even though one initially regional in character), which Chiang could support. The consensus to date has been that this is unlikely, even in Red China’s present desperate state. But we must now ask ourselves whether GRC action might not precipitate such a revolution.

If backing Chiang in a last dramatic gamble was against U.S. interests, Kennedy decided to think about the painful task of dissuading Chiang. Drumright and Cline felt that the United States would shortly get a major approach from the GRC. Instead of waiting for it, there might be some advantage in jumping first by telling them how the U.S. government looked at the situation.

V‧ Conclusion:

The United States has directly waned Red China in a secret meeting in Warsaw against any military adventure against the Chinese Nationalists. The warning was made in a two-hour meeting between U.S. Ambassador to Poland John Moors Cabot and Peiping’s ambassador, Wang Ping-nan. Wang asked for the meeting, informed sources said, and opened by complaining of recent Nationalists threats to invade the mainland. He demanded to know whether the United States was supporting this. Cabot, it was leaned, assured the Red diplomat the United States was not supporting any Nationalist invasion plans. Cabot asked the purpose of Red China’s recent military buildup in Fukien province along the Formosa Straits. Cabot, it was learned, warned against any Red Chinese attach on Formosa, Informants said Quemoy and Matsu, the islands lying immediately off the mainland China coast, were not discussed specially at the meeting. The U.S. diplomat gave assurances the United States was not in any way inspiring the recent statements by Nationalist Chinese officials that the time might be approaching for President Chiang Kai-shek’s long-promised, but always indefinitely postponed attempt to regain the mainland.

U.S. President Kennedy finally assigned the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Harriamn to show U.S. position to GRC. The positions were as follows:

1. U.S. continue to assume that all discussions of return to the mainland are governed by the understanding in the exchange of notes between U.S. Secretary of States and Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs dated December 10, 1954. We know that understanding on this omit has been excellent so far, but we should never omit strait-forward repetition of it.

2. U.S. believed that most careful study is necessary of both intelligence and operational planning for proposed new venture. You may draw, if you wish, on he Cuban misadventure as proof of the dangers of bad intelligence, and of decisions based more on hope than reality. You should emphasize our insistence on continued detailed study and exchange of views.

3. Our earlier approval of 20-man drops was heavily connected with the fact we were no involved 200-man teams with U.S. air support are a wholly different matter, and while we too will await results of further study, you should indicate that support for such drops would be a major shift in policy for us and would have to be supported by compelling evidence.
The American policy turned on what President Kennedy believed about China and on what was willing to do in light of his beliefs. American policy grew for the President’s belief that the People’s Republic of China was an expansionist and threatening power. The restraint demonstrated by the Chinese Communists in circumstances such as the Taiwan Straits did not alter Kennedy’s view that the United States confronted an aggressive Chinese expansionism. Kennedy’s fear of domestic political reprisals also worked to prevent him from introducing new elements into China policy. While new measures did entail domestic political risk, Kennedy did not test in a sustained manner just how serious this risk was.

VI‧ References Materials:

一、 Governmental Publications

I. Official Documents:

Foreign Relations of United States 1961-1963, Volume 22 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996).

1961-1963, Volume 22, Microfiche Supplement (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996).

1964-1968, Volume 30 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1998).

II. Microfiche:

CIA Research Reports: China, 1946-1976 (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, c1982).

Documents of the National Security Council, 1947-1977 (Washington, D.C.: University Publications of America, c1980).

Memos of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: McGeorge Bundy to President Johnson, 1963-1966 (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America).

Minutes of meetings of the National Security Council, 1st supplement (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America c1988).

Minutes of meetings of the National Security Council with special advisory reports (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America c1982).

二、 Books

Allison, Graham T, Essence of Decision: Explaining Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Longman, 1971.

Allison, Graham & Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd, New York: Longman, 1999.
Caro, Robert A., The Years of London B. Johnson. New York: Knopf, 1990.

Cohen, Warren I., America’s Response to China: an Interpretative History of Sino-American Relations. New York: Columbia University Press, c2000.

--------, Nancy Bernkopt Tucker, ed., Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World: American foreign Policy 1963-1968. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Crabb, Cecil V., Jr. and Kevin V. Mulcahy, Presidents and Foreign Policy Making: From FDR To Regan. Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1986.

Foot, Rosemary, The Practice of Power: American Relations with China since 1949. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.

Garver, John W., The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and American Cold War Strategy in Asia. Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, c1997.

George Alexander L. Presidential Decision-making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice. Colorado: Westview Press, 1980.

--------, and Juliette L. George, Presidential Personality and Performance. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998.

Greenstein, Fred I., Leadership in the Modern Presidency. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, c1988.

Halperin, Morton H., Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 1974.

Hart, Paul’t, Eric K. Stern, & Bengt Sundelius, ed., Beyond Groupthink : Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-Making. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997.

Hilsman, Roger, and Robert C. Good, ed., Foreign Policy in the sixties: the issue and the instruments. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965.

----------, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy. New York: Doubleday & Company Inc., 1967.

----------, Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981.

----------, Laura Gaughran and Patricia A. Weistman, The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs: Conceptual Models and Bureaucratic Politics, 3rd ed., Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1992.

----------, The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Struggle over Policy. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996.

Inderfurth, Karl F., Loch K. Johnson, ed., Decisions of the Highest Order: Perspectives on the National Security Council. Pacific Grove, California: Books/Cole, c1988.

Johnson, Lyndon B., The Vantage Point. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971.

Kunz, Diane B. ed., The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade: American Foreign Relations During the 1960s. New York: Columbia University, 1994.

Kusnitz Leonard A., Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: America’s China Policy, 1949-1979. Westport, C.T.: Greenwood Press, 1984.

Lawrence Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars —Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Neustadt, Richard D., Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Regan, 5th ed., New York Free Press, 1990.

Paterson, Thomas G. ed., Kennedy’s Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Rostow, W.W., The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1972.

Rubin, Barry, Secret of State Department and the Struggle Over U.S. Foreign Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1985.

Rusk, Dean, As I Saw It. New York: W. W. Norton, 1990.
Schoenbaum, Thomas J., Waging Peace & War: Dean Rusk in the Truman Kennedy & Johnson Years. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988.

Schlesinger, Arthur, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House. Boston, M.A.: Houghton-Miffin,1965.

Sorensen, Theodore C., Decision-Making in the White House: the Olive Branch or the Arrows foreword by John F. Kennedy. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963.

----------, The Kennedy Legacy. New York: Macmillan, 1963, Special 25th anniversary ed..

Strong, Robert A., Decisions and Dilemmas: Case Studies in Presidential Foreign Policy Making. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, c1992.

Tucker, Nancy B., Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945-1992: Uncertain Friendship. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.

Wilson, James Q., Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. New York: Basic Books, 1989.

三、 Periodicals

Gordon, Leonard H.D., “United States Opposition to Use of Force in the Taiwan Strait, 1945-1962.” The Journal of American History, Vol. 72, No.3, December 1985, pp.637-660.

Goldstein, Steven, “The United States and the Republic of China, 1949-1978: Suspicious Allies.” Cited in (http://www.stanford.edu/group/APAC. 2000.)

Kovachi, Noam, “Mist Across the Bamboo Curtain: China’s Internal Crisis and the American Intelligence Process, 1961-1962.” The Journal of American-East Relations, Vol.5, No.2, Summer 1996, pp135-155.

Lijphart, Arend, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method”, American Political Science Review, Vol.65, No.3, September 1971, pp.685-691.

Thomson, James, “On the Making of U.S. China Policy, 1961-9: A study in Bureaucratic Politics.” China Quarterly, No.50, April/June 1972, pp.220-243.



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